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Abstract
Germany has reduced its emissions of greenhouse gases more than almost any other
industrialized democracy and is exceeding its ambitious Kyoto commitment of a 21% reduction
since 1990. Hence, it is commonly portrayed as a climate-policy success story, but the situation
is much more complex. Generalizing Germany's per-capita emissions to all countries or its
emissions reductions to all industrialized democracies would still very likely produce more than a
two-degree rise in global temperature. Moreover, analyzing the German country-case into eleven
subcases shows that it is a mixture of relative successes and failures.
This illustrates several major problems with the literature on environmental performance.
It has a competitive emphasis, which assesses performance relative to other countries rather than
an external standard, and a bias toward seeing success and ignoring failure. Moreover, the
literature has developed through cross-national studies, which have treated national cases as
undifferentiated wholes. To counter-balance these tendencies, this article uses absolute, external
standards to assess climate-policy outcomes in terms of environmental damage, it focuses on
failures as well as successes, and it analyzes differences in outcomes across policy areas and
economic sectors.
This differentiated analysis leads to three main conclusions, which are also applicable to
other countries. First, high relative performance and high environmental damage can coexist,
and hence a fuller and more realistic understanding of environmental policy and its outcomes
requires keeping both aspects in view. Second, we should see national cases in a differentiated
way and not only in terms of their aggregate performances, since all countries are really mixtures
of successes and failures. Third, researchers on climate policies should more often begin with
outcomes, work backward to policies, and be prepared for some surprises. Some major climate
policies, e.g., the ecological tax reform, may not be very effective. Ironically, the most effective
government interventions may not be explicit climate policies, e.g., the economic transformation
of eastern Germany. Moreover, the lack of policy-making in certain areas may undercut progress
made elsewhere, e.g., unregulated increases in car travel, road freight, and electricity
consumption. Therefore, research on climate and other environmental policies should focus on
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different areas of government intervention and ask different questions about them than it
currently does.
Keywords: climate policy; environmental policy; environmental outcomes; German unification;
Germany; greenhouse gases; renewable energy; ecological tax reform.
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Introduction
For good reason, Germany is seen as a leader in climate protection. Since the early 1990s,
its ambitious reduction targets have been coupled with pioneering climate policies and strong
2

advocacy for international climate agreements. | Moreover, the country's greenhouse-gas
emissions fell by 23% from 1990 to 2010, exceeding its Kyoto target of a 21% reduction. At the
same time, the German case is much richer than the unalloyed success story that is it often
portrayed to be. It is actually a mixture of successes and failures that require elucidation and
analysis.
Doing so illustrates several problems with most scholarly work on environmental
outcomes. The prevailing perspective on environmental outcomes conceives them in terms of
environmental performance, in which countries are compared to each other in terms of the degree
of progress. This article critiques that perspective and argues for the use of external criteria of
environmental quality or damage, for a focus on failures along with successes, and for
comparative analyses of differences in policy areas within countries.
This article addresses a persistent environmental problem, greenhouse-gas emissions and
climate change. Studies of environmental outcomes show that industrialized democracies have
made much progress in some areas as they have become more affluent and technologically
advanced (e.g., SO2 emissions, water pollution from sewage). But in other areas, serious
problems have persisted and even accelerated (e.g., threats to biodiversity, resource use, waste
3

generation, soil contamination, road transportation). Anthropogenic climate change is a major
problem of global scope, which has persisted and worsened since the first actions were taken to
address it in the early 1990s. Germany is a good object for this analysis because it is one of the
most successful industrialized democracies in addressing climate change. Examining a relatively

4
successful case can help us understand how well the Western democracies are addressing
persistent environmental problems.
In the next section, I assess the environmental-performance approach and offer suggestions
for improving it. Next, I briefly describe Germany's climate policies and then link the country's
aggregate record of greenhouse-gas emissions to global warming and climate change, in terms of
the risk of a two-degree rise in global temperature under different scenarios. I then break down
the German country-case into eleven subcases and compare the effectiveness of different
government policies in them. The conclusions discuss the implications of this analysis for
German climate policies and for the study of climate policies and climate-policy outcomes.

The Environmental-Performance Approach to Environmental Outcomes
Most scholarly work on environmental outcomes has proceeded on the basis of cross4

national studies and has taken what can be called an environmental-performance approach. In
this work, countries are ranked according to environmental indicators, cross-national variation is
explained, or cases of successful environmental outcomes are identified and compared with each
other. A related literature examines the relative strength of policies and the role of pioneers and
5

leaders in the international diffusion of relatively strong policies. In both literatures, there is a
focus on relative performance, and on success rather than on failure.

6

This work makes many important contributions. It places attention on the best results,
which encourages others to strive toward them. It draws conclusions about trends and crossnational differences in outcomes, which serve as valuable reference points. Furthermore, it
identifies a wide range of conditions that correlate with relative success and are likely to promote
it. Some writers have focused on a combination of structural capacities together with the

5
7

strategies and skills of actors in using them; others on macro-level socio-economic structures
8

and political institutions; and yet others on imitation by other countries and diffusion through
9

international institutions. These explanations of cross-national differences provide a framework
for addressing questions about what could be done to achieve better outcomes.

However, the environmental-performance perspective also has several biases. First, the
use of relative rankings rather than comparison to an external standard gives the approach a bias
toward competition for its own sake. Relative standards can make a country look like it is doing
well simply because others are doing worse. For example, Germany's per-capita production of
municipal waste was essentially unchanged from 1975 to 1995, yet this record placed it second
best out of seventeen OECD countries, since fifteen of them had increases during that period.
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In this framework, the implicit goal seems to be for a country to become, or remain, a leader
rather than to solve environmental problems. Second, the environmental-performance approach
tends to obscure the continuing environmental harms and burdens that result from the practices
of even the leading countries, and hence draws attention away from the forces that limit or
prevent improvements. There is a bias toward seeing success and ignoring failure, especially in
relatively successful countries.
Third, the widespread use of a large-N cross-national method in this literature means that
country cases almost always are treated in an undifferentiated way. In any given area, whether
sewage treatment or SO2 emissions, a country is seen as a success, a failure, or somewhere in
between. It has a rank within a league table of comparable countries, serves as a data point in a
statistical analysis, or provides an example of an outcome that is clearly more successful than the
average. Again, for relatively successful cases, such as Germany in the climate-policy area, this
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may create a bias toward complacency, because the case tends to be treated simply as a success,
even though it contains aspects of both success and failure.

11

In order to counterbalance these tendencies, I make several proposals. First, the reference
12

points of analysis should include environmental burdens and damage for natural systems, not
only the performance of other countries, the goals set by a national government, the targets
established in international agreements, or the rate of damage per unit of GDP produced or other
measures of efficiency. We need to keep in mind the present rate of damage, recent trends in
damage rates, their likely trajectories, and the cumulative total of environmental damage. In
climate policy, as in many other environmental policy areas, the most reliable data on
environmental damage consists of proximate indicators of environmental burdens, in this case
greenhouse-gas emissions.

13

Second, if we keep one eye on environmental burdens, we are likely to see failure as well
as success in environmental outcomes. In areas of persistent problems, even countries that are
environmental leaders may still produce major environmental damage.

14

Such cases involve both

success, in doing better than other countries and often in reducing damage rates, and also failure,
in not reducing damage rates to what is sustainable for the natural systems on which human
populations depend. Keeping both aspects in view produces a more realistic picture and leads to
different foci and questions than does focusing on success alone.
Third, since failure and success can coexist, differentiated analyses of country cases is
needed. A country's performance can be analyzed into subcases of relative success and relative
failure, which can be defined by policy areas, economic sectors, regions, or time periods. In
addition, even successful aspects may be less successful than they could have been, and some
factors and trends may cancel out gains made elsewhere.
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The approach indicated by these suggestions is meant to complement cross-national studies
of environmental outcomes. As such, it can make several distinct contributions. Differentiated
studies produce new variance to be explained, within a country rather than between countries.
One kind of proximate explanation of the variance, undertaken in this article, involves comparing
the effectiveness of different policies. In addition, deeper causes of policy outcomes can be
sought and related to broad theories of environmental outcomes, although that is beyond the
scope of this article.

15

In addition, comparing the effectiveness of environmental policies and other government
interventions is likely to raise new questions about policies. The most effective policies may not
be those that have received the most attention in the environmental policy literature. In the case
of some explicit, well-documented policies, the most important feature worth explaining may be
their relative ineffectiveness. In other areas, the absence of policies may be the most salient
feature calling for explanation.

Climate Policies in Germany
Germany has been a leading country both in initiating domestic policies to limit
greenhouse-gas emissions and in pressing for international commitments. The following brief
description is limited to the domestic side and to the policies that are most often identified as
significant in scholarly writing on climate policies; these are policies of the federal government,
notwithstanding the many initiatives by the Länder and local governments.

16

Early and relatively

consistent target setting has been an important part of German climate policies. Following the
report of a parliamentary Inquiry Commission formed in 1987, the federal cabinet and parliament
in June 1990 approved a national goal of reducing energy-related CO2 emissions by 25% over
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the 1987-2005 period.
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Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU committed to a reduction of 8% in

six major greenhouse gases (measured in CO2 equivalent), and it ultimately assigned targets to
its 15 members in 1998. As its part of this "burden sharing," Germany accepted a target of a 21%
reduction from 1990 to the 2008-12 period. After 1998, the German government emphasized the
latter, more modest goal of a 21% reduction by 2010 rather than its earlier goal of a 25%
reduction by 2005. However, in its 2005 Climate Protection Program, the government set a new
goal of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by 40% from 1990 to 2020, conditional on the EU
countries committing to a 30% reduction over the same period.

18

The federal government and parliament pursued a number of major policies that were
intended to help achieve these targets. First, they strongly promoted renewable energy. The
Electricity Feed-In Act, put into effect under a Christian-Democratic-led government in 1991,
required utilities to buy renewable electricity (including from wind, biomass, and hydroelectric
power) at highly subsidized rates equalling 90% of retail prices. However, the growth of
renewable energy was undercut somewhat in early 1998 by the liberalization of electricity
19

markets, which led to price competition, and by revisions to the Electricity Feed-In Act that
limited payments for renewable electricity and capped its growth in some regions. Partly in
response, the Renewable Energy Source Act was passed under the Social-Democratic-Green
government and took effect in April 2000 (with revisions in 2004). The new act guaranteed feedin prices for renewable electricity for twenty years and distributed the costs of wind power
subsidies among consumers served by all energy companies rather than only those connected to
the turbines. This act and later amendments also provided a tax exemption for biofuels
beginning in 2002 and increased subsidies for biomass beginning in 2004. With the 2000 act, the
German government set a target of doubling the share of electricity from renewable sources from
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6.25% in 2000 to 12.5% in 2010.

20

The importance of expanding electricity generation from

renewable sources was underscored by the government's 2001 agreement with the nuclear
industry to phase out nuclear power, which led to plans to close all nuclear plants between 2003
and 2021.

21

Those plans were delayed by the new Merkel government after the 2009 Bundestag

elections, but the government resumed the phaseout after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.
Second, in 1995 and 1996, Kohl's government reached voluntary agreements with industry
to reduce CO2 emissions. In exchange, the federal government agreed to forego energy taxes
and a heat-utilization ordinance for industry. Trade associations representing 80% of industrial
production agreed to reduce specific CO2 emissions (i.e., emissions per value added) by 20%
from 1990 to 2005, but resisted targets for absolute emissions. The agreements were
strengthened under Schröder's government in 2000, as industrial associations agreed to reduce
specific CO2 emissions by 28% over 1990-2005 and to cut specific greenhouse-gas emissions by
35% by 2012. Moreover, the power industry agreed to further voluntary cuts, totalling an annual
reduction of 45 million tons (megatons, Mt) in CO2 emissions by 2010, of which 20 megatons
were to come from through increased use of cogeneration, i.e., combined heat and power.
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Third, spurred in part by persistently high unemployment, the red-green parliamentary
majority passed a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform, effective April 1999. This increased
taxes on energy while reducing employers' social-security contributions by about 0.8%; the dual
aims were to promote employment and reduce carbon emissions. The tax reform provided for a
gradual rise in taxes on gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, natural gas, and electricity over the
2000-03 period. By far the highest rates were for gasoline and diesel fuel; coal was exempted,
and manufacturing industry initially paid only 20% of the full rate. The ecological tax was later
strengthened so that, effective in 2003, manufacturing industry, agriculture, and forestry were
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required to pay 60% rather than 20% of the full rate. In addition, laws passed in 2000 and 2002
gave feed-in subsidies and other protections to combined heat and power facilities in both
manufacturing and the power-generation industry; this sector had been undermined by EU-driven
electricity deregulation in the late 1990s.
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Fourth, a variety of energy-efficiency policies were passed in the 1990s and 2000s.
Notably, a Buildings Energy Efficiency Ordinance took effect in 2002, requiring insulation and
boiler improvements in older residential buildings, penalties for electric heating, measures
intended to reduce energy consumption by one-third in new buildings, and eventually energy
efficiency certificates for new houses.

24

Finally, the German government enacted an emissions

trading law in 2004, which implemented the EU's Emissions Trading System. However, the first
round (2005-07) was very lax, calling for less reductions than the voluntary agreements did. The
Second National Allocation Plan (2008-12) was initially rejected by the European Commission
and then made somewhat stricter, providing for cuts of 20.9 megatons per year by the end of the
period, which was 4.4% of 2005 emissions for the covered sectors.

25
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Germany's Greenhouse-Gas Emissions and Major Global Climate Change
Major reductions in emissions
Largely as a result of these policies, Germany has significantly reduced its greenhouse-gas
emissions and is one of the two leaders among the industrialized democracies, along with Britain.
From 1990 to 2009, the last year for which cross-nationally comparable data are available,
Germany's annual emissions declined from 1,248 megatons of CO2-equivalent to 920
megatons.
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This was a reduction of 26.3 percent from the Kyoto baseline year, an impressive

decline in international comparison that put Germany on target to easily meet its Kyoto target of
a 21% reduction from 1990 to the 2008-12 period. Even in 2008, before economic recession
drove the emissions of Germany and other Western democracies sharply lower, Germany's
emissions were 22% lower than in 1990. Among the industrialized democracies in 2009, only
27

Britain's decline (-27%) was close to Germany's, although several others also reported relatively
large reductions (Sweden at -17%, Belgium -13%, Denmark -10%, and France -8%). While
many East European "economies in transition" reported much larger decreases than Germany,
ranging from -32% in the Czech Republic to -60% in the Ukraine, their reductions were made
possible by their wholesale transitions from extremely energy-inefficient command economies to
market economies.
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Germany's improvement stands out even more when compared with the large increases
over this period in the U.S. (+7%), Canada (+17%), Australia (+30%), and some rapidly
developing European countries such as Ireland (+14%), Portugal (+26%), and Spain (+30%).
The worsening trend in the U.S., which increased emissions by 441 Mt/year in this period,
exceeded the 328 Mt/year reduction in Germany.

29
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From emissions to climate change
However, to balance the picture of progress and apparent success in Germany, it is
necessary to look at how much harm still is being done by Germany's current rates of emissions.
This requires linking global emissions to global temperature change and climate change, and
Germany's emissions to global emissions.
The effects of temperature change on climate change involve much uncertainty and experts
make a range of projections.
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Nonetheless, at present there is a very broad agreement among

climate scientists that human-induced warming of greater than two degrees Celsius compared to
pre-industrial temperatures would entail major, undesired changes to the climate system and
temperature increases that would persist for centuries.
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In their reviews of the literature, the

IPCC and the Stern Review project that two degrees of warming would increase the damage from
floods, storms, and erosion, and would salinize freshwater and reduce water supplies for
hundreds of millions of people. They estimate that such warming would also reduce tundra areas
by one half and cool conifer forests by one quarter, put 30% of species at risk of extinction, and
reduce crop yields in tropical regions. It would change the distribution of some disease vectors
and produce mass migration in some cases and overall negative effects on human health.
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Therefore, in the following I will take two degrees as the reference point when assessing
the likelihood and timing of major anthropogenic climate change under different emissions
scenarios. However, it is important to bear in mind that the actual effects of a two-degree rise
could be more or less severe, and that there is no clear threshold between "safe" and "dangerous"
amounts of global temperature rise.

33

What amount of greenhouse-gas emissions is permissible without exceeding two degrees
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of warming? Since damage is cumulative and major damage would occur only as a result of
years of continued emissions, a cumulative greenhouse-gas budget approach is reasonable.
However, projecting the effects of emissions on global temperature also involves much
uncertainty. The following analysis is based on the results of the widely cited model by Malte
Meinshausen and colleagues, which lies in the mid-range of estimates of the sensitivity of
climate to greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere.

34

At the same time, it is worth

noting that this model understates the long-term challenge of reducing emissions because it
assumes extremely low emissions after 2049.
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That means that if this model's estimates are

biased, they are likely to be biased toward optimism about avoiding major climate change in the
long term. The result of this model is that cumulative global anthropogenic emissions of the
Kyoto greenhouse gases would need to be limited to about 1500 billion tons (gigatons, Gt) in
CO2 equivalent during the period from 2000 to 2049. Doing so would hold the risk of major
climate change (two degrees of warming) to 25%.
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Since an estimated 551 gigatons were
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emitted worldwide from 2000 to 2010, including land-use changes, this leaves a remaining
budget of only 949 gigatons for the period from 2011 through 2049.
Hence, the question is, how do Germany's emissions reductions contribute to the world
staying within, or exceeding, this budget? Of course, the answer will depend on emissions trends
in all countries, including the industrialized democracies, former communist countries, and
developing countries.

38
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Germany as a model for the world?
First, I will assume equal per-capita emissions for all countries in the world. In this
scenario, Germany's per-capita emissions, which were 11.4 tons/person-year in 2010, are far
from being a good model.

39

Germans' emissions are somewhat lower than those for the

industrialized democracies as a whole (14.5 tons per person-year in 2005), but much higher than
the world average (6.0 tons per person-year in 2005).
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If all countries emitted at Germany's per-

capita rate from 2011 onward, we would exhaust the 1500-gigaton budget in 11 years, by the year
2021, and have a 25% risk of major climate change (see Table 1).

41

Of course, countries with

higher per-capita emissions of greenhouse gases, such as the U.S. (22.1 tons/person-year in
2010), are even poorer models for the rest of the world.

42

If all countries emitted at the U.S. rate,

we would exhaust the 1500-gigaton budget in only six years, in 2016.

43
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Table 1: Germany’s Contributions to Global Climate Change: Three Scenarios
Scenario

Assumptions

Emission rates
(Kyoto gases, in
CO2-equivalent)

Global equal
per-capita
emissions,
imitating
Germany

All countries
emit at
Germany's
2010 per capita
emissions rate

11.4 tons/person
worldwide

Global equal
per-capita
emissions,
imitating U.S.

All countries
emit at U.S.'s
2008 per capita
emissions rate

Global
inequality, with
industrialized
democracies
imitating
Germany's
1995-2010
trend starting in
1996

Industrialized
democracies
declining
1.2622
percent/year
from 1995
emissions;
EITs stable at
their rates in
2000;
DCs' rates rising
108 percent
over 2000-2049

EITs

Number of years
after the year 2010
until we would
exhaust the 1500-Gt
CO2eq budget (with
a 25 percent chance
of two degrees
warming)
11 years
(exhausted in 2021)

Number of years
after the year 2010
until we would
exhaust the 2000-Gt
CO2eq budget (with
a 50 percent change
of two degrees
warming)
16 years (exhausted
in 2026)

22.1 tons/person
worldwide

6 years (in 2016)

9 years (in 2019)

Democracies:
falling from 11.8
to 6.3 Gt/yr.;

23 years (in 2033)

32 years (in 2042)

EITs:

stable at
4.05 Gt/yr.;
DCs: rising from
23 to 48 Gt/yr.
over 2000-2049

=economies in transition; DCs =developing countries; Gt =gigaton
Sources: see notes in text.
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How much would Germany need to reduce its emissions in order to serve as a model for the
world? Assuming a 1500-gigaton budget for the years 2000-2049 and an average world
population of 8 billion over that period, then the "fair share" of emissions in each country would
be an estimated 3.04 tons/person-year.

44

Germany's current per-capita emissions are about three

and a half times as high as that. Therefore, Germany would need to reduce its per-capita
emissions by an additional 73%, below their 2010 levels, in order to reach its fair share, if the
goal is to avoid two degrees of warming. If the goal is to prevent all warming, an even sharper
estimated reduction of 86% in Germany's per-capita CO2 emissions would be needed.

45

Germany as a model for the industrialized democracies?
Second, I will assume continued unequal per-capita emissions, and ask whether Germany's
recent emissions reductions are a good model for the industrialized democracies. What would
happen if all of them had followed Germany's example and reduced their emissions as Germany
has done over the last two decades? To be more realistic, I take Germany's trend in declining
emissions over the 1995-2010 period, thus factoring out the emissions reductions that were due
to unification, a kind of phenomenon that other Western democracies are unlikely to be able to
imitate and that Germany is unlikely to repeat. Germany reduced its emissions by 17.3% from
1995 to 2010, which is an average reduction of 1.26% per year, compounded.
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What if all the

industrialized democracies had reduced their emissions at that rate every year starting in 1996
and going forward indefinitely? By 2049, they would have reduced their emissions by slightly
less than 50% when compared with 1990.
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However, this contribution would not have been enough to avert major climate change. In
reaching this conclusion, I make two additional assumptions. First, emissions by the postcommunist countries would be stable at their levels in 2000, taking account of the restructuring
after the collapse of their state-managed economies. Second, I assume a mid-range scenario for
business-as-usual emissions growth by the developing countries.

47

Under these assumptions,

even with the industrialized democracies' emissions declining at 1.26% per year starting in 1996,
the 1500-gigaton budget would be exhausted in 23 years, by 2033. After that date, we would be
committed to a 25% risk of major climate change, and nine years later, in 2042, we would be
committed to a 50% risk (see Table 1).

48

Of course, trends in the developing countries depend on many factors that are difficult to
predict, such as economic growth rates, energy efficiency trends, and climate policies. Hence,
another approach is to make no assumptions about them and to ask how much the developing
countries could emit by 2050 if the industrialized democracies had reduced their emissions at
Germany's 1.26% annual rate of reduction beginning in 1996. Unfortunately, even this relatively
sharp rate of reduction would not leave much of the emissions budget remaining for the
developing countries to use. For the world to stay under the 1500-gigaton cap, developing
countries could emit only an annual average of 17.2 Gt/year over the 2000-49 period, which is
31% lower than their actual emissions of 24.9 Gt in 2005.
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Any medium-term decline in

developing country emissions is, of course, extremely unrealistic. From 1990 to 2005, those
emissions rose at about 2.4 percent a year, totaling a 43% increase.

50

In short, Germany's per-capita emissions are far from being a good model for the rest of the
world, and even its rate of reduction so far is not a good model for the industrialized
democracies. German emissions are still so high that even if all other Western countries had
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made progress similar to Germany, they would lead to major damage to the climate system long
before 2050, under any reasonable assumptions about developing countries' emissions.

A Disaggregated View of the German Case
Germany's large aggregate reduction in emissions represents both success and failure. It is
a success because the reduction was higher than in any other Western country, but it is also a
failure because Germany's per-capita emissions have not been adequate to avoid contributing to
major damage to the climate system. This point of view represents a modification of the usual
environmental-performance perspective. It raises two distinct questions: Why has Germany
reduced its emissions so much, and why has it not reduced them more than it has? These
questions will be addressed first by identifying subcases in terms of policy areas and economic
sectors that vary in the degree of emissions reduction or increase. Disaggregating the German
case shows that it is a mosaic of successes and failures.
This analysis relies on the best available estimates of climate-policy outcomes in Germany.
Mainly these are the German government's estimates of policy effects, as reported in its Fourth
and Fifth National Communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).
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These estimates are based on studies by a consortium of research

institutes under contract to the environment ministry: the Deutsches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung, the Forschungszentrum Jülich, the Fraunhofer-Institut, and the ÖkoInstitut. Their studies estimate the annual emissions decreases that are due to a wide range of
policy measures relative to business-as-usual scenarios, including continued economic growth in
the absence of the government interventions. In addition, I have used other studies where
52
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available, to estimate the impact of German unification policies, renewable energy, waste
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regulations, and the ecotax reform.

55

In order to move from analyses relative to business as

usual to a picture of how Germany's absolute emissions reduction from 1990 to 2010 was
achieved, I have used Hans-Joachim Ziesing's macro-scale analysis.
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These estimates have several limitations. In particular, they are sensitive to the
assumptions made about business-as-usual scenarios. Also, since the studies are largely
retrospective, they may not fully capture the effects of policies adopted in the last few years, such
as the many policies adopted in the 2007 climate policy package or the 2009 energy saving
57

ordinance. However, these estimates have been used in other academic studies and to my
knowledge, no scholarly critiques of them have been published. While the estimates are unlikely
to be precisely accurate, they are the best available means for systematically comparing
government interventions and they are plausible given the magnitudes claimed in relation to the
absolute changes in emissions. They are likely to be accurate enough for the purpose here, which
is to identify relative successes and failures and to draw broad conclusions about the diversity of
climate-policy outcomes. In any case, the purpose here is not to recommend or criticize
particular types of policies as such, since the policy outcomes discussed here depend to a large
degree on the details of the policies in question, the implementation process, and the social,
economic, and environmental contexts of Germany.
Table 2 includes the most important government policies that were designed to reduce
emissions, as well as two other interventions that had significant effects although they were not
conceived as climate policies (unification policies, waste regulations). This table shows a great
variety in the impacts of interventions from 1990 to 2010.

58

First, Germany had two government

interventions with very large effects: the economic transformation of eastern Germany following
unification in 1990, and the promotion of renewable energy. These two interventions together
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represent 53% of the emissions reductions attributable to government interventions.
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Second,

the German government has had three moderate successes that have been underemphasized in the
academic literature on climate policies: recycling laws together with waste regulations reducing
methane; voluntary agreements with adipic acid producers reducing nitrous oxide; and residential
building ordinances to improve energy efficiency.

60

Together, these reduced emissions by an

estimated 110 megatons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2eq/year), which is 29% of those attributable
to government interventions.

61
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Table 2: Estimated Relative Contributions of Major Government Interventions to Germany’s
Reductions in Kyoto Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 1990-2010
Source of reduction or increase in emissions
Emissions reduced
Percent of total emissions
(-) or added (+) in
reductions attributable to
CO
megatons 2government action
eqivalent/year
Eastern German economic transformation policies*
-112.9
29 percent
Renewable energy policies
-95.3
24 percent
Waste regulations and biomass ordinance regarding
-58.4
15 percent
methane; recycling laws and regulations
Voluntary agreement between government and adipic
-26.0
7 percent
NO
acid producers regarding 2
Residential building ordinances
-25.8
7 percent
Ecological tax reform
-18.2
5 percent
Voluntary agreements between government and
-8.2
2 percent
CO
industry regarding 2 and other greenhouse gases
Emissions trading system
-0.4
0 percent
Industrial and commercial ordinances on heating and
-11.0
3 percent
energy saving
Combined heat and power (cogeneration) policies,
-5.5
1 percent
including industrial cogeneration
Transportation policies (fuel tax, rail regionalization,
-16.0
4 percent
emissions-based road tax, high-sulphur fuel tax,
cycling promotion, climate protection campaign, 130g
CO2 standard for cars)
Agricultural policies on biogas, biomass, and organic
-5.8
1 percent
farming (mainly regarding methane and N2O)
Coal mining: policy-induced production decline and
-8.8
2 percent
methane regulations (regarding methane)
100 percent
Subtotal: all reductions attributed to government
-392.3
actions
Reductions not driven by policies, including CO2
reductions due to increased energy efficiency and
reduced carbon content of fuel mix
Subtotal: all reductions (gross)

-189.1
-581.4

Increases due to growth in income per capita**
Increases due to growth in population**
Total net reductions 1990-2010

+214.6
+25.7
-341.1

* through 2000 ** energy-related CO2 emissions; all other items are for the Kyoto gases estimated
through 2010.
Sources: see the text and the accompanying notes.
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Third, three major climate policies were flawed and largely ineffective. Although they
generated much publicity and have been much studied, the voluntary agreements with industry,
the ecological tax reform, and emissions trading together produced only an estimated 27 Mt/year
in reductions, which is 7% of the total due to government action.
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Fourth, the growth in per-

capita income and population led to large increases in transportation, household heating, and
electricity consumption, which together increased emissions by about 240 Mt/year.
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Without

these sources of increase, Germany's overall temperature-adjusted emissions would have fallen
by 44% rather than 25% over the 1990-2010 period.
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The next section takes a closer look at these eleven subcases of relative success and failure.
It compares the effectiveness of a number of policies, both explicit climate policies and others.

Comparing the Outcomes of Policies
Effective government interventions
In terms of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, the most effective government
interventions have involved the privatization and restructuring of the East German economy in
the course of unification. Although these were not the result of policies intended to protect the
climate, they must be included in any understanding of how Germany has reduced its
greenhouse-gas emissions. These economic changes were the result of massive government
interventions, including privatization by an agency of the federal government (the
Treuhandanstalt); financial transfers from the west to east were over 750 billion Euros during the
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1990-2000 period, including over 160 billion Euros for privatization and infrastructure
upgrades.
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A comprehensive study estimates that these interventions reduced emissions of CO2

by about 105 Mt and of all greenhouse gases by 113 Mt/year.
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Although unification, of course, depended on large forces outside the control of the West
German government, the government strongly shaped the process of economic transformation
and with it, the resulting emissions reductions. The transition to a market economy and the
associated economic restructuring in the five new eastern Länder and East Berlin presented not
only a great need for investment, but also great opportunities for reducing fuel use, increasing
energy efficiency, and reducing carbon intensity. The 1990 currency reform sharply raised the
relative costs of production in East Germany and triggered a collapse in industrial production,
which fell by 60% in value from 1989 to 1991. Energy production was privatized, which led to
increased efficiency, the shutting of many lignite plants in eastern Germany, and fuel switching,
mostly to natural gas, which is only about half as carbon-intensive as coal. Lignite fell from 69%
to 38% of total primary energy consumption for electricity and heat production in eastern
Germany from 1990 to 1995.
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In addition, energy price subsidies were ended and energy efficiency in buildings was
greatly improved, as 560 billion Euros were invested in eastern German structures in the 1990s.
As a result, overall energy use in the east fell 35% from 1990 to 1995.
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Moreover, the

reduction of livestock numbers and fertilizer use in the eastern states contributed to a decline in
methane and nitrous oxide emissions in agriculture totaling about 10 MTCO2eq/year.

70

Remarkably, by 2004, 86% of Germany's decline in energy-related CO2 emissions had taken
place in the eastern states, which had only 20% of Germany's population and 7% of its GDP in
1991.
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The second largest source of greenhouse-gas reductions in Germany was the growth in
energy production from renewable sources, mainly biomass and wind, but also energy from the
Sun, waste, and hydroelectric facilities. As a result of the feed-in tariff policies described earlier,
renewable energy grew rapidly. The share of total primary energy consumption from renewable
sources rose from 1.9% in 1990 to 10.9% in 2010, and renewable-source electricity rose to 17%
of electricity consumption in the latter year.
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From 1990 to 2009, increases in renewable energy

in electricity, heat generation, and transportation resulted in an estimated 95 MtCO2eq/year in
emissions reductions.
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About 81% of the avoided emissions were due to increased use of wind

and biomass, with minor contributions from increased use of biofuels, solar energy, and
hydroelectric power. Although the German government and scholars emphasize the growth of
74

wind power, the BMU data indicate that the increased use of biomass in this period prevented
more emissions (49 Mt/year) than did wind power (27 Mt/year).
Third, several different policies, especially regarding methane and nitrous oxide, led to
major decreases in emissions. A 1993 regulation limited organic waste from human settlements
going to landfills and required recovery of landfill gas. Although the justification for the
regulation made no mention of greenhouse-gas emissions or climate change, together with a 2000
biogas ordinance, it reduced emissions by an estimated 30 Mt/year in 2010.
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Together with

energy savings due to the recycling law and regulations, policy measures in the waste sector
reduced emissions by an estimated 58 MtCO2eq/year in 2010.
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In addition, the German

government made a voluntary agreement with two producers of adipic acid, who began using
thermal decomposition of nitrous oxide in 1997 and hence rapidly reduced their emissions of that
greenhouse gas, by 26 MtCO2eq/year.
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Finally, the federal building ordinances adopted in 1995

and 2002, together with a housing modernization program for the eastern states and a small CO2
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reduction program for residences in the western states, reduced emissions by an estimated 26
Mt/year.
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Flawed and relatively ineffective climate policies
The ecological tax reform, described above, gets much attention in policy studies, but its
effects on greenhouse-gas emissions seem to have been modest, amounting to only an estimated
18 Mt/year in CO2 emissions.
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The relative ineffectiveness of the ecotax is due to several flaws.

Its size is rather small, at 16 billion Euros or 0.7% of GDP in 2003. The ecotax helped raise
Germany's total environmental taxes to only 2.5% in 2004, which placed the country only 16th
out of 30 OECD countries.
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Moreover, the tax suffers from qualitative defects. It is not based

on the carbon content of the various fuels and it taxes different kinds of emitters very unequally.
As initially introduced in 1999, the tax rate ranged from 0 Euros per ton of CO2 emitted (for
coal) to 24 Euros (for heating oil) to 36 Euros (electricity) to 282 Euros for unleaded gasoline.
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While households and the transportation sector generally pay the full rate, existing electrical
heating received a 50% discount and manufacturing an 80% discount, later reduced to 40%.
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Another flawed policy concerns the voluntary agreements between the German
government and industry, also described above. All the voluntary agreements produced a total
estimated reduction of only 8 Mt/year in emissions.

83

Although manufacturing industry

experienced a large absolute decline in CO2 emissions (58 Mt/year over the 1990-2008 period),
over two thirds of the decline had occurred by 1995, largely due to the collapse of East German
industry, and hence before the voluntary agreements had even been made. Therefore, the
voluntary agreements represent mostly credit claiming by industry rather than a driver of
investment planning.
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Another problem is that the agreements were not legally binding; once
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they were voluntarily arrived at, compliance and reporting were also voluntary. Thus, although
the German power industry agreed to reduce CO2 emissions by 20 Mt/year through increases in
cogeneration by 2005, instead its emissions increased by 30 Mt/year.
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Moreover, industry made

the agreements in order to avoid government policies that might have been more effective at
reducing emissions. The 1995-96 agreements were made in exchange for a government promise
to not introduce an ecotax or a heat utilization ordinance, while the 2000 agreements were made
to avoid an ordinance requiring industrial energy audits.
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Emissions trading also has been ineffectual so far in Germany. The German government
enacted an emissions trading law in 2004, which implemented the EU's Emissions Trading
System. However, as already noted, the first National Allocation Plan (2005-07) was very lax. It
provided for only 1.5 million tons/year in CO2 reductions, which was less than what the
voluntary agreements with industry and the power sector had already called for.
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The Second

National Allocation Plan (2008-12) was somewhat more stringent, calling for cuts of 20.9
megatons per year in the energy sector and energy-intensive industries from 2005 to 2012.
However, an external event, the 2008-09 recession, intervened to drive emissions below the cap
anyway. Hence, the German government estimates that emissions trading will produce only 0.4
Mt in annual reductions in CO2 by 2010, and only 0.6 Mt by 2012.
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Finally, there were also other flawed policies or missed opportunities. In energy
production, the EU-driven liberalization of electricity markets led to the modernization and fuller
use of lignite power plants in eastern Germany and a rise of 29 Mt/year in CO2 emissions over
the 1999-2003 period, more than half the 1990-99 reduction in this sector.
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Electricity

deregulation also led to the shutdown of many cogeneration plants in the late 1990s. Hence, heat
produced by cogeneration plants, heating plants, and industrial heat fell by 19% from 1996 to
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2000. This was a setback for climate policy since cogeneration saves about 20% of total energy
compared with separate heat and power generation.
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Moreover, hard coal subsidies continued at

relatively high levels; although the federal subsidy was reduced from 4.7 billion Euros in 1998, it
was still 1.9 billion Euros in 2008. As a result, energy consumed from hard coal declined more
slowly than it would have in the absence of subsidies. It fell only 15% in absolute terms from
1990 to 2006, and by a total of 26% through 2010.
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Non-policies and rising consumption
So far, I have described how government interventions reduced greenhouse-gas emissions.
But in key areas of the economy, the absence of government policy-making has permitted
massive increases in emissions. In housing, electricity, and transportation, rising incomes and
largely unregulated consumption contributed to major increases in CO2 emissions, totalling
about 240 Mt/year.
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However, these increases were masked by large emissions declines due to

efficiency improvements and fuel switching, including those driven by policy measures, in the
same sectors.
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Therefore, emissions in the transportation sector present a very mixed picture. A major
success was increased fuel efficiency, which led to an 18% reduction in CO2 emissions per
passenger kilometer for cars.
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Since cars and motorcycles make up 80% of the total traffic

volume, this was a major improvement. In particular, diesel motors became much more efficient
through high-pressure fuel injection, and Germany became a large lead market for this
technology. Passenger cars powered by diesel engines rose from 10% of the German new car
market in 1990 to 42% in 2010.
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However, these efficiency gains were counterbalanced by other trends in passenger
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transportation. First, the 18% decline in specific CO2 emissions could have been much larger if
carmakers had not also made cars heavier and more powerful. New passenger cars registered in
Germany became 41% more powerful, with virtually all the increase occurring after 1996; the
share of four-wheel-drive vehicles also increased, from 3.2% to 11% of the total.
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Moreover,
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Indeed, all

the 18% efficiency increase was counterbalanced by a 27% increase in car travel.

forms of passenger travel increased, from about 10,900 to 14,000 kilometers per person-year.
The less environmentally damaging forms of transportation, bus and rail travel, actually declined
slightly as a share of all travel, a trend that is expected to continue.
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The trend toward physical growth has been even stronger in freight transportation, which
grew by a massive 69% over the 1991-2009 period, much faster than the 27% growth in real
GDP.
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Efficiency increases were significant, with CO2 emissions per ton-kilometer falling by

40%, but they lagged far behind the increase in freight volume.
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About half of the increase in

freight transportation was due to the liberalization of transportation within the EU and the
increase in trade with Eastern Europe.
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In 2009, there was the equivalent of a ton of goods

travelling 5000 kilometers for each German resident every year. Since road freight rose much
more sharply than the use of barges and railways, those less environmentally damaging forms of
freight transport fell from 35% to 27% of the total, while road freight's share rose to 70% through
2005.
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Even after the introduction of kilometer-based charges for heavy trucks on the freeways

in 2005, the volume of freight transported on the roads continued to rise, by 17% over the next
three years,
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before falling with the recession in 2009.

As a result of increased car and truck travel, there has been only a very small net decline in
CO2 emissions due to road transportation, about 5 Mt/year, which is 3% of the 1990 baseline.
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Emissions reductions could have been much larger if it were not for the increases in car driving,
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vehicle weight and power, and freight transportation by truck.
In households, too, increased consumption due to lifestyle changes counteracted emissions
reductions due to government policies. Policies to increase energy efficiency and reduce coal use
for home heating helped reduce households' CO2 emissions by about 28 Mt/year, or 21%, from
1990 to 2010.
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But those improvements would have been much larger were it not for contrary

trends in consumption. Households became smaller (fewer persons per household) and
residential units larger as people moved from rented apartments to houses, especially in eastern
Germany.
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Hence, living space per person rose by 20%, and residential fuel use (oil, gas, and

coal) rose 3% despite the increased efficiencies.
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Finally, unregulated technological change drove a 13% increase in total electricity
consumption through 2010. This was possible because Germany lacks a comprehensive
electricity conservation policy. Consumption rose across all sectors due to the development and
dissemination of new electrical products, both producer and consumer goods. Households
increased their electricity consumption by 20%, largely due to the increased use of air
conditioning, other electrical appliances, cell phones, other rechargeable devices, and other
devices that use energy in standby mode. Similarly, the rise of information technology in offices,
commerce, and industry helped lead to a 20% increase in electricity consumption in the service
sector and a 5% increase in manufacturing and mining. As a result, despite fuel switching from
coal to renewables and natural gas and roughly stable nuclear power production, factors that
should have produced large reductions in CO2 emissions, total emissions from the power
generation sector were basically flat from 1995 to 2008, declining by only 4%.

Conclusions
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Summary of the findings
I have argued for certain revisions to the environmental-performance approach to
environmental outcomes. It is important to use natural systems as reference points and be open
to seeing both successes and failures, which is best done through sufficiently detailed case
studies of countries. In its present form, the environmental-performance perspective is
inadequate, because it downplays environmental damage and unsustainability. Hence, it fails to
see the failures that are mixed in with successes and that indicate that there is much room for
improvement, even in the top performers.
Applying these suggestions in this article leads to several conclusions about the German
case and more generally about the study of climate policies and outcomes (as well as other
environmental outcome areas) in leading industrialized democracies. First, high performance
and high environmental damage can coexist, and hence a fuller and more realistic understanding
of outcomes requires keeping both aspects in view. In climate policy, even a Western democracy
with one of the strongest performances since 1990 is contributing to a projected temperature rise
beyond two degrees and hence to major environmental damage. This critique applies just as well
to the other relatively successful countries, such as Britain, Sweden, France, Belgium, and
Netherlands, all of which have reduced emissions since 1990 and some of which have lower percapita emissions than Germany.
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Second, we should see national cases in a differentiated way and not only in terms of their
aggregate performances. Leading countries are really mixes of successes and failures. Germany
achieved notable reductions in some areas, through the economic structuring of the eastern states,
promotion of renewable energy, regulation of methane in the waste sector, agreements regarding
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nitrous oxide in adipic acid production, and building efficiency ordinances. Other policies were
much less effective, including the voluntary agreements with industry, ecological tax reform, and
emissions trading. The same general point also applies to laggards such as the U.S., which has
had improvements in energy efficiency through federal appliance standards and strong recent
growth in wind power, alongside other areas of significant climate-policy failure, such as an
increase in coal-generated electricity.
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Differentiated studies of country cases can help correct

the tendency to over-simplification found in large-N studies of environmental outcomes.
Dividing a country-case into subcases based on policies, economic sectors, time periods, or
regions also creates more variance to explain, and can aid in the development and testing of
theories of environmental outcomes.
Third, increased consumption in areas without strong policies can undo many of the gains
made in other areas of government intervention. Germany had significant sources of emissions
increase, in the growth of passenger and freight transportation, residential living space, and
electricity consumption. These trends are found in most Western countries, including those with
overall emissions reductions. Passenger transportation increased in 21 out of 22 rich OECD
countries, and freight transportation increased in 19 of them over the 1990-2004 period. In
Britain, the other leading industrialized democracy in emissions reductions, passenger car travel
nonetheless rose 18%, road freight by 38%, and electricity consumption by 15% from 1990 to
2006.
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Fourth, research on climate policies should begin with outcomes, and then ask somewhat
different questions about policies than it has so far. The areas of greatest effectiveness in
reducing emissions in Germany contrast greatly with the climate policies that policy researchers
have identified as most important. The policy literature has focused on six policy areas, which
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generally are also those that received the most political attention: emissions target setting;
renewable energy; voluntary agreements with industry; the ecological tax reform; energy
efficiency measures in buildings; and emissions trading.
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But three of these major climate

policies, i.e., the ecotax, voluntary agreements, and emissions trading, have not led to major
reductions so far. This does not mean that these types of policies are inherently ineffective in
Germany or other countries. But we need to focus more on the policy details, implementation
methods, and contextual factors that were responsible for their relative ineffectiveness in
Germany.
At the same time, other policies have been more effective but have received less attention
in environmental policy studies, partly because they were not adopted explicitly to protect the
climate, i.e., the economic transformation of eastern Germany and the waste regulations.
Another example is the liberalization of energy markets in Britain, which led to fuel switching
that is estimated to have produced about half of that country's impressive emissions
reductions.
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Finally, in some areas, such as the growth in transportation and electricity

consumption, the absence of major policies is responsible for increased emissions, and
explaining that absence deserves much more study.
In short, it is sometimes helpful to think backwards from environmental outcomes rather
than starting with policies, because policies vary greatly in effectiveness and emissions can also
depend on factors besides explicitly designed climate policies. This would raise questions that so
far have received very little attention. For example, why did Germany shut down eastern
German power plants after unification? Why were the ordinances regarding methane in the
waste sector adopted and implemented so effectively? Why was the ecotax adopted in such a
weak form? Why were policies on conserving electricity, curbing suburbanization in the eastern
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states, expanding public transportation, or limiting the huge increases in road transportation not
even seriously considered, let alone adopted?
Party politics as a possible explanation
A systematic causal explanation of the relative successes and failures of climate policies in
Germany is beyond the scope of this article, and is undertaken elsewhere.
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But I would like to

discuss one theoretical theme here, which has already cropped up in the policy narratives above,
namely the effects of political parties. Were some governing parties more successful than others
in adopting policies that actually reduced emissions?
The large-N studies of environmental outcomes reach two main conclusions about parties.
First, strong social-democratic parties in opposition tend to increase environmental performance,
but when in government their results are no better and in some cases worse than other parties.
Second, the parliamentary strength of green parties is clearly associated with environmental
performance.
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How do the German cases analyzed above bear on those findings? At first glance, the
CDU-led governments (1982-98, 2005-present) seem to have been more effective than the SPDGreen government (1998-2005). Unification, the first renewable energy law, the waste and
recycling ordinances, and the voluntary agreement with adipic acid producers concerning nitrous
oxide were all highly effective interventions that were adopted under Chancellor Kohl, while a
main initiative of the red-green government, the ecotax, had relatively little impact. The contrast
is not really that stark, since both types of governments had mixed records. The ineffectual
voluntary agreements with industry concerning CO2 were a cornerstone of Kohl's climate policy,
and both the Schroeder and Merkel governments pressed for overly generous quotas for German
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industry in the Emissions Trading System.
Moreover, the red-green government also had some successes, in the 2002 buildings
ordinance and especially the strengthening of the renewable-energy law, which helped
renewable-energy production to take off in the 2000s. Along with unification, renewable-energy
promotion was one of the two most successful government interventions in the entire period.
Even though the feed-in tariff policy began in 1990, it is unclear if much credit should be given
to CDU-led governments for this success, since the entire initiative for the policy in 1990 came
from parliament (first from a CDU and a Green deputy), it was initially resisted by the CDU-FDP
cabinet, and the government very nearly succeeded in reducing feed-in tariffs in 1997. That
attempt failed only because public protests from unions, trade associations, and religious groups
led some CDU parliamentary deputies to join the Greens and SPD in opposing the measure.
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Nonetheless, CDU-led governments on the whole had more success than did the SPDGreen government. However, this was probably due more to accidents of timing than to
ideologically rooted differences between the CDU and SPD or their interest-group ties. Both
unification and the international emergence of the global-warming issue occurred in the 1989-92
period, while Kohl was chancellor, leading his government to pick the low-hanging fruit among
potential climate policies and leaving only costlier measures (the ecotax, raising feed-in tariffs)
for the later SPD-Green government to attempt.
Moreover, party competition was a key driver of the climate policies of both kinds of
government, and the environmental movement and the Greens were the crucial actors in that
process, with the SPD often joining later and more ambivalently. This process began in the
1980s, when the CDU took action to restrict SOX emissions and the SPD gave up support for
nuclear energy; the major parties were seeking to gain credibility on environmental issues after
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losing it through their opposition to environmental campaigns in the previous decade.
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Since

the Greens affected both major parties, the main differences in their records were due to
accidents of timing. And since the CDU led the government for the first fifteen years after the
Greens entered the Bundestag, that party had more opportunities to enact environmental policies
than did the SPD.
Overall, the German cases support the findings of the large-N studies concerning party
impacts. Party competition matters much more than who is in government, and green parties
matter much more than do social-democratic, Christian-democratic, or other types of parties.
Moreover, an examination of case studies within a country helps to flesh out the mechanisms
behind the correlations discovered in the large-N studies. The effects of the major parties in
government depended largely on competitive pressure from the environmental movement and the
Greens.
Looking forward
The practical implications of this article may seem grim. However, there are some hopeful
signs in Germany recently. Solar power took off strongly after 2009 and already generates about
half as much as wind power does. Its surge is helping to keep renewable energy growing at a
rapid pace, doubling every seven years.
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Residential and commercial buildings cut their CO2

emissions from heating by about 25% over the last ten years, largely due to the increased use of
biomass for home heating and the 2002 buildings energy-efficiency ordinance.
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As a result,

Germany's overall emissions reductions accelerated slightly in the six years since 2005, with
emissions dropping at a 1.3% annual rate after declining only 1.0% a year in the previous ten
years. In trying to meet their ambitious reduction targets, German governments will be able to
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draw on two decades of experience with effective and ineffective policies.
In any case, my point is not that action to limit climate change is hopeless since even the
leaders' efforts have been clearly inadequate. Rather, the analysis shows that Germany, the other
top performers, and all industrialized democracies need to work more effectively at making
deeper emissions reductions more quickly. Even if we are unlikely to prevent two degrees of
warming, it is still worth preventing even greater degrees of warming and the climatic
consequences they would bring. This article has identified many failures in Germany, but each
of these is also an opportunity for future emissions reductions, e.g., through fuel switching from
lignite and hard coal to renewables and natural gas, more support for cogeneration, a larger and
carbon-based ecotax, stricter car fuel efficiency standards, higher road freight charges to fund
investment in railroads, and lower emissions-trading caps. And of course, imitating the
performance of countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia would bring us past two
degrees of warming even faster and would commit the planet to even higher total amounts of
warming and environmental damage than following Germany's example.
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